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1. Right to collective action in cross-border employment con-
texts as a fundamental social right 
Fundamental rights comprise social and employment rights, and they are mostly 
referenced in international human rights documents and national Constitutions. 
Social rights enable citizens to demand services and assistance (regarding the right 
to health, the right to education, social security rights, etc.) from the State, and in 
contrast, envisage obligations for the States, materialised by means of  State measures 
or direct actions. In employment contexts, such rights include, for instance, the right 
to collective or industrial action, and to collective bargaining. In particular, industrial 
actions, including sympathy actions and blockades, strikes, lockouts and so on, are 
the usual means of  achieving coverage for weak parties. All such rights are covered 
by domestic laws, which may differ from one State to another. The issue analysed in 
this article regards collective action in cross-border employment contexts, a discipline 
that has been left to national legislation and its implementation to domestic courts. 
With regard to the Member States of  the European Union (EU), it seems clear that 
there are different provisions and different parameters to evaluate the legitimacy of  
industrial action. Even considering EU law, it is not possible to find specific rules 
governing collective action (or redress). 
This paper aims to illustrate the recognition of  fundamental social rights, 
particularly the right to collective action, in international and European instruments, 
and to point out the protection offered at the national level and in Europe, with 
particular regard to EU law. In the EU Member States, there is no uniformity between 
the national laws concerning the procedural aspects and the criteria for the legitimacy 
of  collective action. Indeed, the main problems arise in cross-border contexts. EU 
law and private international law rules, mainly on the applicable law and jurisdiction, 
do not provide a consistent legal framework. An evaluation of  existing EU private 
international law is carried out in order to reflect on the necessity of  specific EU 
legislation aimed at guaranteeing the recognised fundamental social rights.1  
First, it is appropriate to provide the notion of  collective action contained in 
the 2013 Communication of  the Commission, which states that it is: 
a procedural mechanism that allows, for reasons of  procedural economy 
and/or efficiency of  enforcement, many similar legal claims to be bundled 
into a single court action. Collective redress facilitates access to justice in 
particular in cases where the individual damage is so low that potential 
claimants would not think it worth pursuing an individual claim. It also 
strengthens the negotiating power of  potential claimants and contributes to 
the efficient administration of  justice, by avoiding numerous proceedings 
concerning claims resulting from the same infringement of  law.2 
This procedural mechanism is deemed to be a means of  protection favouring 
weak parties, even those organised in trade unions for employment issues, who are 
1 See infra, para. 4.
2 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of  the Regions “Towards 
a European Horizontal Framework for Collective Redress”, COM(2013)401 final, 11 June 2013, 4, 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1455276612525&uri=CELEX:52013DC0401.
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asserting claims for their rights to be respected and observed, and for the defence of  
their economic and social interests.
In general, the right to strike has a constitutional basis in many States, as an 
individual fundamental right to be exercised collectively. A strike is a form of  protest 
considered by the workers themselves as the most effective means to achieve their 
desired goal. It can be freely exercised, without any prior procedural requirements 
and without any consequences to individual employment contracts.3
There are various international legal bases for the right to collective activities, 
including the right to strike, such as the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights,4 the ILO Conventions No. 875 and No. 98,6 the 1950 
European Convention of  Human Rights (hereinafter ‘ECHR’),7 the 1989 Community 
Charter of  Fundamental Social Rights of  Workers,8 the 1961 (then 1996) European 
Social Charter (hereinafter ‘ESC’)9 and the 2000 (then 2007) EU Charter of  
Fundamental Rights (hereinafter ‘EU Charter’).10 In those provisions, each State 
party (or Member) is deemed to undertake steps using the maximum of  its available 
resources or by all appropriate means, with a view to progressively achieving the full 
realisation of  the rights, and it must comply with these obligations.
EU law, primarily the European Court of  Justice (ECJ) case-law, expressly 
recalls international and European instruments in order to endorse their objectives 
and purposes, respectively, in regulating and applying laws in the field of  fundamental 
social rights. 
For instance, Article 28 of  the EU Charter clearly provides a list of  rights: 
It contains social rights, such as the freedom of  association, the right to strike, 
collective negotiation agreements for workers, participation in government and job 
security, as well as classical rights. The right to exercise collective industrial action 
can be utilised to achieve collective labour agreements offering better employment 
conditions than workers could achieve individually. In other words, trade unions, 
whose freedom of  organisation is guaranteed, must be given the right to effectively 
act for workers. Thus, the right to bargain for collective agreements, strengthened by 
industrial action, is decisive for such effective action. Nevertheless, Article 28 states 
that rights must be safeguarded in accordance with Union law and with national laws 
and practices. 
On the one hand, it is clear that not only procedural, but also substantive, 
national rules must be observed, since the European Union does not have exclusive 
competence in this field.11 On the other hand, EU law, including EU objectives, 
values and purposes, must be considered. At this point, it is necessary to mention 
3 Federico Fabbrini, “Europe in Need of  a New Deal: On Federalism, Free Market and the Right to 
Strike”, in Georgetown Journal of  International Law, 43, 2012, spec. 1185-86, available at SSRN http://
ssrn.com/abstract=2029145.
4 See Article 8. 
5 “Convention concerning Freedom of  Association and Protection of  the Right to Organise”, 
adopted in San Francisco on 9 July 1948, 31st ILC session, and entered into force on 4 July 1950.
6 “Convention concerning the Application of  the Principles of  the Right to Organise and to 
Bargain Collectively”, adopted in Geneva on 1 July 1949, 32nd ILC session, and entered into force 
on 18 July 1951.
7 See Article 11. 
8 See Article 13.
9 See Article 6. 
10 See Article 28. 
11 See Article 153 TFEU and infra, para. 3. 
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the two decisions of  the ECJ Grand Chamber, Viking and Laval.12 The Court held 
that the right to strike is a fundamental right of  the EU constitutional order, but it 
recognised the need to balance workers’ rights with economic freedoms. This means 
that it has extended EU free movement principles in ways that allow employers to 
prevent or penalise what would otherwise be regarded domestically as permissible 
industrial action and that compromise the right to strike.13
In any case, the last word is left to the national judges. 
2. Protection of  social rights at the national level
The right to strike, as a social collective action right, is legally recognised in 
some of  the Constitutions of  the Member States, but it is mainly considered by 
their Constitutional Courts. A short analysis of  the Portuguese and Italian contexts 
is included here in order to show the way in which social rights (in general, without 
specific reference to collective action) are taken into account, and the challenges 
and obstacles that their protection may encounter. Indeed, both the Italian (Corte 
costituzionale) and Portuguese (Tribunal Constitucional) Constitutional Courts have 
addressed social rights protection in some of  their recent judgements, which have 
been delivered in the context of  the economic crisis. 
In general, judges apply constitutional principles with the aim of  fully and 
effectively pursuing a high level of  protection for constitutional rights. The balance 
between fundamental rights and economic measures has been implemented by 
the ECJ with reference to fundamental economic freedoms as pillars of  EU law. 
Nevertheless, one could note that EU law clearly refers to the common constitutional 
traditions of  the Member States,14 so the ECJ should also probably take national 
values into account. The finding of  the ECJ, which recognised the economic 
freedoms as prevailing over social rights, appears not to have been followed by 
(some) national judges. It is, however, important to remember that, in social and 
employment contexts, the EU does not have an exclusive competence. Therefore, 
a dialogue between the national and European judges could be a viable way to find 
an appropriate legal basis to develop a new legislative act addressing cross-border 
employment disputes. After all, the EU should pursue the protection of  fundamental 
social rights as part of  the general principals of  EU law.
Broadly speaking, both the Italian and Portuguese Constitutional Courts have 
considered the protection of  social rights in the current economic context dealing 
with austerity measures (EU-recommended), which have involved substantial cuts in 
their social provisions.
The Tribunal Constitucional, in its judgement No. 187 of  5 April 2013,15 declared 
the unconstitutionality of  some of  the austerity measures, in particular, those on 
12 See infra, para. 3.
13 Tonia Novitz, “The Internationally Recognized Right to Strike: A Past, Present and Future Basis 
upon Which to Evaluate Remedies for Unlawful Collective Action?”, in International Journal of  
Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations, 30, No. 3, 2014, 357-379.
14 See Article 6, 3 TEU.
15 Available at http://www.tribunalconstitucional.pt/tc/acordaos/20130187.html.
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budgetary cuts.16 The 2015 Country Report on Portugal17 includes an overview of  
the relevant measures.18 Moreover, it analyses the right to work: It “has probably been 
the most affected fundamental right in the context of  the economic crisis. It has been 
affected by the crisis itself  ([which] led to a significant rise of  unemployment) and 
by austerity measures. These measures included pay-cuts, reduction[s] of  severance 
payments and increase[s] in working hours without additional pay.”19
The Portuguese Constitutional Court judgement No. 187 of  2013 concerned 
the suspension of  holiday pay, which it declared unconstitutional as a violation of  
the principle of  equality. The Court has stated that the international and European 
obligations had a constitutional legal basis, but that they should not impose legislative 
measures that lead to the violation, not only of  equality and proportionality 
principles, but also of  human dignity.20 Constitutional law doctrine has deemed this 
case to be a condemnation of  the violation of  constitutional rights in relation to the 
EU agreement (the 2011 Economic Adjustment Programme)21 implemented by the 
national provisions.22
The Tribunal do Trabalho do Porto, which applied to the ECJ with a reference for 
a preliminary ruling, claimed respect for EU law.23 The Portuguese judges asked for 
an interpretation of  Articles 20, 21(1) and 31(1) of  the EU Charter of  Fundamental 
Rights in a case dealing with national legislation that provides for salary reductions 
for certain public sector workers. The ECJ stated that it “clearly lacks jurisdiction 
with regard to the request”, because EU law was not involved.24 Some considered 
the request to be an expression of  a “European constitutionality issue”,25 in which 
16 For some comments, see Miguel Nogueira de Brito and Luís Pereira Coutinho, “A igualdade 
proporcional, novo modelo no controlo do princípio da igualdade?: comentário ao Acórdão do 
Tribunal Constitucional nº 187/2013”, in Direito & Política / Law & Politics, Loures No. 4, Jul.-Out. 
2013, 182-191; Ravi Afonso Pereira, “Igualdade e proporcionalidade: um comentário às decisões 
do Tribunal Constitucional de Portugal sobre cortes salariais no sector público”, in Revista Española 
de Derecho Constitucional, número 98, Mayo/Agosto 2013, http://www.cepc.gob.es/en/publications/
journals; Vitalino Canas, “Constituição prima facie: igualdade, proporcionalidade, confiança (aplicados 
ao “corte” de pensões)”, in Número 1, Janeiro 2014, http://e-publica.pt/constituicaoprimafacie.
html; Jorge Reis Novais, “O direito fundamental à pensão de reforma em situação de emergência 
financeira”, Número 1, Janeiro 2014, http://e-publica.pt/odireitofundamentalpensao.html.
17 Mariana Rodrigues Canotilho, “The Impact of  the Crisis on Fundamental Rights across Member 
States of  the EU Country Report on Portugal”, Study for the LIBE Committee, European Parliament, 
Brussels, February 2015, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/studies. For an overview, see also Isabel 
Távora and Pilar González, “Chapter 5 - The Reform of  Joint Regulation and Labour Market 
Policy during the Current Crisis: National Report on Portugal (EN)”, in Joint Regulation and Labour 
Market Policy in Europe during the Crisis, Aristea Koukiadaki et al. (eds), 2016, http://www.etui.org/
Publications2/Books/Joint-regulation-and-labour-market-policy-in-Europe-during-the-crisis. 
18 Canotilho, “The Impact,” 16 ff.
19 Ibid., 34.
20 Daniele Butturini, “Portogallo: le norme nazionali imposte dall’austerità europea di fronte al 
giudizio di costituzionalità”, 30 May 2013, http://www.forumcostituzionale.it.
21 More info at http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/assistance_eu_ms/portugal/index_en.htm. 
22 Butturini, “Portogallo,” 26.
23 Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal do Trabalho do Porto (Portugal), made by decision 
of  6 January 2012, lodged on 8 March 2012, Case C-128/12.
24 See ECJ (Sixth Chamber), Order of  7 March 2013, Case C-128/12, Sindicato dos Bancários do Norte 
e altri v. BPN - Banco Português de Negócios SA, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.js
f ?text=&docid=135145&pageIndex=0&doclang=PT&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&c
id=917597.
25 Carmela Salazar, “Crisi economica e diritti fondamentali – Relazione al XXVIII Convegno 
annuale dell’AIC”, 11 October 2013, http://www.rivistaaic.it/relazione-al-xxviii-convegno-annuale-
® UNIO - EU LAW JOURNAL Vol. 2,  June 2016
25 Cinzia Peraro
the Portuguese judges searched for a European legal basis to declare the national 
legislation at stake to be inadmissible. They believed that the domestic measures were 
contrary to the principles of  equality and non-discrimination, as well as to the right 
to fair and just working conditions. 
Again with reference to Portuguese austerity measures, the European Court of  
Human Rights (ECtHR) dealt with the case Da Conceição Mateus and Lino Jesus Santos 
Januário v. Portugal.26 The case concerned the payment of  the applicants’ public sector 
pensions, which were reduced in 2012 because of  cuts to Portuguese government 
spending. The Court examined the compatibility of  the reductions of  the applicants’ 
pension payments with Article 1 of  Protocol No. 1 (protection of  property). The 
Court held that the pension reductions had been a proportionate restriction on 
the applicants’ right to protection of  property. In light of  the exceptional financial 
problems that Portugal faced at the time, and given the limited and temporary nature 
of  the pension cuts, the Portuguese government had struck a fair balance between 
the interests of  the general public and the protection of  the applicants’ individual 
right to their pension payments.
It is clear that the economic crisis and the urgent national measures may affect 
individual social rights negatively, as in the abovementioned circumstances. Recourse 
before the European Courts, i.e. the ECJ or the ECtHR, has been sought with the 
aim of  pursuing European protection of  social rights. Both Courts, however, have 
rejected such requests, either because of  their incompetence or because of  the States’ 
margin of  appreciation.
On the one side, the ECJ held that “é jurisprudência assente que as exigências 
que decorrem da proteção dos direitos fundamentais vinculam os Estados Membros 
sempre que estes sejam chamados a aplicar o direito da União. Todavia, importa 
recordar que, nos termos do artigo 51, n.°1, da Carta, as disposições desta têm por 
destinatários “os Estados Membros, apenas quando apliquem o direito da União”, e 
que, por força do artigo 6, n.°1, TUE, que atribui valor vinculativo à Carta, esta não 
cria nenhuma competência nova para a União e não altera as competências desta. 
Ora, não obstante as dúvidas expressas pelo órgão jurisdicional de reenvio quanto 
à conformidade da Lei do Orçamento de Estado para 2011 com os princípios e os 
objetivos consagrados pelos Tratados, a decisão de reenvio não contém nenhum 
elemento concreto que permita considerar que a referida lei se destina a aplicar o 
direito da União. Não ficou assim demonstrada a competência do Tribunal de Justiça 
para responder ao presente pedido de decisão prejudicial. Nestas circunstâncias, há 
que concluir que o Tribunal de Justiça é manifestamente incompetente para conhecer 
do pedido de decisão prejudicial apresentado pelo Tribunal do Trabalho do Porto.”27
On the other side, the ECtHR stated that the margin of  appreciation “is usually 
allowed to the State under the Convention when it comes to general measures of  
economic or social policy. Because of  their direct knowledge of  their society and its 
needs, the national authorities are in principle better placed than the international 
judge to appreciate what is in the public interest on social or economic grounds, and 
the Court will generally respect the legislature’s policy choice unless it is “manifestly 
dell-aic-crisi-economica-e-diritti-fondamentali.html.
26 ECtHR (Second Section), Decision of  8 October 2013, Applications No. 62235/12 and No. 
57725/12, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-128106. 
27 Judgment Sindicato, paras. 10 – 14 (this judgment is only available in Portuguese and French).
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without reasonable foundation.”28 
Some of  the economic and financial measures that were produced to tackle the 
economic crisis have been the object of  some important judgements of  the Corte 
costituzionale. Among them, sentence No. 310 of  10 December 201329 concerned the 
freezing of  the salaries of  university teachers. The Court held that, by virtue of  the 
reasonableness principle, the development of  such measures must be considered in 
the current economic, legal, national and European contexts.30 
Italy has enacted a number of  legislative and other measures related to the crisis, 
which are summarised in the 2015 Country Report on Italy.31 Among them, in Law 
92/2012 – the so-called Legge Fornero,32 named after the then Minister of  Employment 
– the main objectives were more equal protection of  workers, regardless of  the type 
of  employment contract, and more flexibility in hiring and dismissing workers.33 An 
Italian trade union (CGIL) “submitted a complaint to the European Commission 
denouncing that the Reform infringes EU law (i.e. Council Directive 1999/70/EC 
of  28 June 1999 concerning the framework agreement on fixed-term work) because, 
among other things, it eliminates the requirement for a justification to use short-term 
employment contracts and, by so doing, ‘translates into a wide broadening of  the 
unjustified use of  short-term contracts’. Similar allegations were raised to the ECJ 
in the case Mascolo34 concerning the use of  short-term contracts to meet essentially 
permanent needs in the Italian public education sector.”35 The ECJ held that
Clause 5(1) of  the framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded 
on 18 March 1999, which is set out in the annex to Council Directive 
1999/70/EC of  28 June 1999 concerning the framework agreement 
on fixed-term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP, must be 
interpreted as precluding national legislation, such as that at issue in the 
main proceedings, which, pending the completion of  competitive selection 
procedures for the recruitment of  tenured staff  of  schools administered 
by the State, authorises the renewal of  fixed-term employment contracts to 
fill posts of  teachers and administrative, technical and auxiliary staff  that 
are vacant and unfilled without stating a definite period for the completion 
of  those procedures and while excluding any possibility, for those teachers 
28 ECtHR, Decision of  8 October 2013, para. 22.
29 Available at http://www.cortecostituzionale.it/actionPronuncia.do.
30 Italian Constitutional Court, sentence No. 310 of  10 December 2013, para. 13.4.
31 Giuseppe Nastasi and Giuseppe Palmisano, “The Impact of  the Crisis on Fundamental Rights across 
Member States of  the EU Country Report on Portugal”,  Study for the LIBE Committee, European 
Parliament, Brussels, February 2015, 17 ff., http://www.europarl.europa.eu/studies. For an overview 
of  the reforms, see also Sabrina Colombo and Ida Regalia, “Chapter 4 - The Reform and Impact of  
Joint Regulation and Labour Market Policy during the Current Crisis: Italy (EN)”, in Joint Regulation and 
Labour Market Policy in Europe during the Crisis, Aristea Koukiadaki et al. (eds), 2016, http://www.etui.org/
Publications2/Books/Joint-regulation-and-labour-market-policy-in-Europe-during-the-crisis.
32 For a critical comment, see Gabriele Piazza and Martin Myant (ETUI), “Italy’s Labour Market 
Reforms of  2012: Did They Reduce Unemployment?”, 2016, http://www.etui.org/Publications2/
Working-Papers/Italy-s-labour-market-reforms-of-2012-did-they-reduce-unemployment. 
33 Nastasi and Palmisano, “The Impact,” 52 ff.
34 ECJ (Third Chamber), 26 November 2014, Judgment Mascolo, Case C-22/13 and others, http://
curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf ?text=&docid=161282&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN
&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=221997.
35 Nastasi and Palmisano, “The Impact,” 57 ff. 
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and staff, of  obtaining compensation for any damage suffered on account 
of  such a renewal. It appears, subject to the checks to be carried out by 
the referring courts, that such legislation, first, does not permit objective 
and transparent criteria to be identified in order to verify whether the 
renewal of  those contracts actually responds to a genuine need, is capable 
of  achieving the objective pursued and is necessary for that purpose, and 
second, does not contain any other measure intended to prevent and 
punish the misuse of  successive fixed-term employment contracts.36 
Balancing social rights with economic measures is the core issue. National courts 
have claimed respect for the fundamental rights provided for in the EU Charter in 
relation to the restrictive measures adopted by the States to tackle the economic 
crisis. As pointed out by the ECJ, the Member States must respect fundamental rights 
whenever they are called upon to apply EU law, as stated by Article 51, 1 of  the EU 
Charter. By contrast national measures imposing restrictions on social rights, such as 
those in the cases before the Portuguese and Italian Constitutional Courts, should not 
fall within EU law, because it is provided that under Article 5 TFEU the Member States 
shall coordinate the economic policies within the EU. Thus, the measures adopted by 
them in the field of  economic policies should not be subject to EU general principles.
A similar issue has arisen according to the ECJ case-law on EU competence in 
economic governance and monetary matters.37 The Court stated that Member States are 
not implementing EU law, within the meaning of  Article 51, 1 of  the EU Charter, when 
they establish a stability mechanism such as the ESM (European stability mechanism, 
under Article 136, 3 TFEU, the insertion of  which is provided for by Article 1 of  
Decision 2011/199). In particular, it observed that the EU and FEU Treaties do not 
confer any specific power on the Union to establish the ESM and its creation is not 
capable of  affecting the exclusive competence held by the Union under Article 3, 1, 
c TFEU in the area of  monetary policy for the Member States whose currency is the 
euro. So, ESM and national measures adopted as a result of  it are not included in the 
EU law scope. It follows that Member States are not obliged to respect EU Charter’ 
rights and they are not subject to ECJ jurisdiction. However, such statement has been 
criticised for its inconsistency. In the field of  Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) 
the Member States and institutions when adopting economic or monetary measures 
are required to comply with the Charter, but this does not occur when the same or 
similar measures are adopted in the field of  ESM.38 
Moving ahead to collective action in cross-border contexts, one could 
wonder if  such action, i.e. a strike or another industrial action, may be legitimately 
exercised with the aim of  obtaining respect for social rights. Indeed, international, 
European and national instruments have recognised the right to collective redress 
as a fundamental social right. Thus, the remaining questions concern the most 
suitable solution for guarantying social rights in a period of  economic crisis, as well 
as the (constitutional) rights that should be guaranteed. Because of  all of  the above 
considerations, the choice between the public interest and the protection of  social 
36 Judgment Mascolo, para. 120. 
37 See, for instance, ECJ (Full Court), Case C-370/12, 27 November 2012, Judgment Pringle. 
38 See Judgment Sindicato, para. 11. For a comment, see Francesco Munari, “Da Pringle a Gauweiler: i 
tormentati anni dell’unione monetaria e i loro effetti sull’ordinamento giuridico europeo,” Il Diritto 
dell’Unione europea, No. 4, 2015, 741 ff.
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rights, both constitutionally provided, is left to national legislators or judges, bearing 
in mind that restrictions can be justified only when they are necessary to uphold 
other equivalent constitutional values.39 
3. Protection of  social rights in Europe
Given the recognition of  social rights in Europe, as mentioned above with 
specific regard to the Council of  Europe’s instruments (the European Convention 
on Human Rights and the European Social Charter) and European Union law (EU 
Treaties and the EU Charter of  Fundamental Rights), their protection is a primary 
objective. On the one side, the EU needs to address economic and social divergences, 
which have been widening. On the other side, the difficulty in overcoming the crisis 
is largely due to the weaknesses in the current monetary union model, which gives 
national governments only one option for adjusting their economies: cost-cutting 
and ever-greater flexibility in the labour markets.40
Within the political debate about how to tackle the economic needs and social 
challenges, the European Commission presented the 2013 Communication entitled 
“Strengthening the social dimension of  the economic and monetary union,”41 in 
which it “proposes a number of  initiatives to strengthen the social dimension of  
EMU with a particular focus on three points: reinforced surveillance of  employment 
and social challenges and policy coordination; enhanced solidarity and action on 
employment and labour mobility; strengthened social dialogue.”42 This action falls 
within the scope of  the Europe 2020 Strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive 
growth, which places social policy at the core of  the EU’s economic plan.43 Following 
the Communication, the European Parliament, in its 2013 Resolution,44
urges that social considerations be placed at the core of  European 
integration and mainstreamed into all EU policies and initiatives; considers 
that the social dimension should be a reconciliation/trade-off  factor in 
terms of  ‘benchlearning’; notes that the purpose of  the social dimension 
of  the EMU is to provide social security and a sufficient living standard for 
current and future generations; considers it important, therefore, for EU 
citizens to see that their Union is capable of  promoting social progress.45 
39 Fabbrini, “Europe in Need,” 1187. 
40 See more at: http://www.easpd.eu/en/content/commission-proposes-social-scoreboard-deepen-
social-dimension-emu#sthash.ouhgd0D6.dpuf.
41 European Commission, “Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament 
and the Council, Strengthening the social dimension of  the economic and monetary union”, 
COM(2013)690 final, 2 October 2013, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=14
54279713587&uri=CELEX%3A52013DC0690. Recently recalled by Vice-President Dombrovskis, 
Speech on February 4, 2015, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/2014-2019/dombrovskis/
announcements/european-parliament-strengthening-social-dimension-emu_en. 
42 See COM(2013)690 final, 1.
43 Ibid., 2 ff.
44 European Parliament, Resolution of  21 November 2013 on the Commission communication 
entitled ‘Strengthening the social dimension of  the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)’, P7_
TA(2013)0515, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-
TA-2013-0515+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN.
45 P7_TA(2013)0515, paras. 4–6. 
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It should be noted that employment and social policies fall, very largely, under 
the national competence of  the Member States: Social policy is an area of  shared 
competence between the EU and the Member States (Article 4, 2, b TFEU). Pay, 
the right of  association, the right to strike and the right to impose lock-outs are 
beyond EU competence (Article 153, 5 TFEU). The harmonisation of  national laws 
in the areas of  social exclusion and the modernisation of  welfare protection systems 
are also beyond EU competence, though the EU may coordinate the national laws 
(Article 153, 1 TFEU). Furthermore, any EU legislation relating to employees’ 
protection against dismissal, the information and consultation of  workers, collective 
representation and the defence of  workers’ and employers’ interests, and the 
conditions of  employment for non-EU nationals, requires unanimity in the Council 
(Article 153, 2 TFEU). “The absence of  a general regulatory authority by the EU over 
employment conditions and social law is the key point regarding the interrelation of  
social and labour rights and Internal Market law.”46
However, ECJ case-law has expanded upon the Treaties. Two decisions are 
controversial with specific reference to the protection of  workers’ rights through 
trade union actions, industrial actions or strikes. In Viking,47 the Court found that 
the rights of  workers to associate and take collective action were fundamental rights 
recognised by the EU legal order. Such collective action may legitimately restrict 
the right of  the establishment of  an undertaking that intends to relocate to another 
Member State, in order to protect the workers of  that firm. The restriction should not 
be disproportionate, and its evaluation is left to the referring court. This ECJ finding 
demonstrates that “the right of  trade unions to exercise their collective fundamental 
right is very seriously hampered by the application of  internal market law.”48
In Laval,49 the Court again found that trade unions had been exercising a 
fundamental right to take collective action, recognised by EU law, but that its practical 
exercise had led to barriers to inward investment that were disproportionate. The ECJ’s 
reasoning started with the consideration that the provisions on the free movement 
of  services in the TFEU have a horizontal direct effect. “The right of  trade unions 
of  a Member State to take collective action by which undertakings established in 
other Member States may be forced to sign the collective agreement for the building 
sector is liable to make it less attractive, or more difficult, for such undertakings to 
carry out construction work in Sweden, and therefore constitutes a restriction on 
the freedom to provide services within the meaning of  Article 49 EC.”50 Only non-
discriminatory, justified and proportionate industrial action is lawful.
46 European Parliament, Study, “EU Social and Labour Rights and EU Internal Market Law”, 
September 2015, 59, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2015/563457/IPOL_
STU(2015)563457_EN.pdf.
47 ECJ (Grand Chamber), Case C-438/05, 11 December 2007, Judgment International Transport 
Workers’ Federation and Finnish Seamen’s Union v. Viking Line ABP and OÜ Viking Line Eesti, http://
curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf ?text=&docid=71495&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&
mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=15635.
48 Bruno De Witte, “Balancing of  Economic Law and Human Rights by the European Court of  
Justice”, in Human Rights in International Investment Law and Arbitration, P.M. Dupuy et al. (eds), 2009, 
206. See Judgment Viking, paras. 44–47 (similarly in Laval, para. 91 ff.).
49 ECJ (Grand Chamber), Case C-341/05, 18 December 2007, Laval un Partneri Ltd v. Svenska 
Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundets avdelning 1, Byggettan and Svenska 
Elektrikerförbundet, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=71925&mode=lst&pa
geIndex=1&dir=&occ=first&part=1&text=&doclang=EN&cid=16415. 
50 Judgment Laval, para. 99.
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In his opinion, Advocate General Mengozzi noted: 
Article 49 EC [now Article 56 TFEU] cannot impose obligations on trade 
unions which might impair the very substance of  the right to take collective 
action. […] That assessment must, in my view, be extended to a situation 
where, as would appear to be the case here, the right to take collective 
action is allowed not only in order to defend the interests of  trade union 
members but also to enable them to pursue legitimate objectives recognised 
by Community law, such as the protection of  workers in general and the 
fight against social dumping in the Member State concerned. Nevertheless, 
since that right is not absolute, its exercise must be reconciled with the 
Community public interest requirement represented by the freedom to 
provide services in the Community.51 
Collective action should be a means aimed at the protection of  social rights.
One may argue that the ECJ respects the right to collective bargaining, collective 
action and to strike only within the limits of  economic freedom, with a clearly lower 
value and not as an equivalent fundamental right. In doing so, it adopts a negative 
approach that is restricted to industrial action taken substantially by host country 
unions and not by the posted workers.52 
One author observed the inconsistency in the ECJ’s reasoning, because it calls 
upon national judges to maintain a balance, i.e. to determine if  the collective action 
is proportionate and justified, without a direct decision about the prevalence of  one 
right over another. He noted: “in both cases, the Court uses the term ‘balancing’, 
although the impression one gets is that it gave rather more weight to the economic 
freedoms invoked by the trade unions. A particular quirk of  the EU judicial system 
is that the outcome of  the balancing does not always have to be decided by the 
ECJ itself. The preliminary reference mechanism may create a situation where it is 
not the international court itself  (in this case, the ECJ) that decides on the balance 
to be struck, in a given case, between economic objectives and human rights, but 
the national courts where the case originates – albeit under guidance of  general 
guidelines formulated by the ECJ.”53 
Furthermore, following the ECJ’s decision, the Swedish Trade Union 
Confederation (LO) and the Swedish Confederation of  Professional Employees 
(TCO) submitted a complaint54  to the European Committee of  Social Rights (ECSR) 
emphasising that industrial action against a foreign employer is thus forbidden 
in the 2010 Lex Laval, in violation of  Articles 6 and 19 of  the ESC and the ILO 
Convention No. 87. The ILO Committee, in its 2013 Report, had requested that 
the Swedish Government “ensure that workers’ organisations representing foreign 
51 AG Mengozzi, Opinion delivered on 23 May 2007, Case C-341/05, Judgment Laval, paras. 251-252, 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=62532&mode=lst&pageIndex=1&dir=
&occ=first&part=1&text=&doclang=EN&cid=477785.
52 Rudolf  Buschmann, “Tensions between Trade Union rights in the EU Charter of  Fundamental 
Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights”, January 27, 2015, https://
courtsandcharters2.files.wordpress.com/2015/01/tensions-between-trade-unionrights-in-the-eu-
charter-of-fundamental-rights-and-the-european-conventionon-human-rights.doc.
53 De Witte, “Balancing of  Economic Law,” 206-207. 
54 ECSR, Decision on admissibility and the merits: Swedish Trade Union Confederation (LO) and Swedish 
Confederation of  Professional Employees (TCO) v. Sweden, Complaint No. 85/2012.
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posted workers are not restricted in their rights simply because of  the nationality 
of  the enterprise.”55 After it stated its competence,56 the ESCR affirmed that the 
Swedish legislation “constitutes a disproportionate restriction on the free enjoyment 
of  the right of  trade unions to engage in collective action, in so far as it prevents trade 
unions taking action to improve the employment conditions of  posted workers over 
and beyond the requirements of  the above-mentioned conditions.” This collective 
redress has a symbolic value: The trade unions applied to the ESCR to claim respect 
for international standards, because collective action aimed at protecting social rights 
is missing in the EU system.57
The main assumption of  the ECJ must be given attention: “[T]he right to 
take collective action, including the right to strike, must therefore be recognised 
as a fundamental right which forms an integral part of  the general principles 
of  Community law the observance of  which the Court ensures.”58 The Court 
recognised the existence of  a fundamental right to strike in the EU constitutional 
order. Nevertheless, the express recognition did not lead to enhanced protection 
of  that right. The ECJ designed a balancing test between free movement and social 
rights that ensures the protection of  the right to strike only when industrial action is 
suitable and proportionate to the achievement of  the workers’ goal.59
Indeed, the Laval and Viking judgements contain references to a number of  
international treaties to which the Member States are parties, as well as instruments 
developed by the Member States at the (then) Community level. The international 
treaties to which the Court referred are the 1961 European Social Charter, to which 
Art. 136 EC (now Art. 151 TFEU) specifically refers, and the ILO Convention No. 87. 
At the EU level, the Court referred to the Community Charter of  the Fundamental 
Social Rights of  Workers and the EU Charter.60 In fact, the Court is entitled to draw 
inspiration from those instruments for the protection of  human rights, as well as 
from the ECHR, as provided for in Article 6, 2 TEU. The ECJ then added that the 
exercise of  that right may, nonetheless, be subject to certain restrictions in accordance 
with Community law and national law and practices.61
However, the ECJ did not refer to the common constitutional traditions of  the 
Member States in which the right to strike is recognised in either the Laval ruling or 
the Viking case. It did not derive any substance from those sources. However, in Laval, 
Advocate General Mengozzi pointed out that “the Court has already emphasised 
that its principal aim, as is apparent from its preamble, is to ‘reaffirm rights as they 
55 See International Labour Conference, 102nd Session, 2013, Report of  the Committee of  
Experts on the Application of  Conventions and Recommendations, http://www.ilo.org/ilc/
ILCSessions/102/reports/reports-submitted/WCMS_205472/lang--en/index.htm.
56 See Complaint No. 85/2012, para. 73.
57 Silvana Sciarra, “Pluralismo sindacale multilivello nella crisi. Gli orizzonti della Carta sociale 
europea”, in Studi sull’integrazione europea, IX, 2014, 240 ff.
58 Judgment Viking, para. 44. See Gavin Barrett, “Lawyers, the Question of  Whether the European 
Union is Good for Workers, and How to Help Doom a Referendum on the Lisbon Treaty Without 
Really Trying”, 2009, 40, http://www.um.edu.mt/europeanstudies/books/CD_MESA09/pdf/
gbarrett.pdf, who wrote that “the case has actually created at least one benefit for trade unions: the 
recognition of  the right to strike as general principle.”
59 Fabbrini, “Europe in Need”, 1201. See also Adam P. McCann, “The CJEU on Trial: Economic 
Mobility and Social Justice”, in European Review of  Private Law, 22, No. 5, 2014, available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2494591.
60 Judgment Laval, para. 90 and Viking, para. 43. 
61 Judgment Laval, para. 91 and Viking, para. 44. 
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result, in particular, from the constitutional traditions and international obligations 
common to the Member States, the TEU, the ECHR, the Social Charters, and the 
case-law of  the Court … and of  the ECtHR’.”62 He then noted that 
as regards the constitutional traditions of  the Member States, whilst I am 
not of  the view that they must be examined exhaustively, in view of  the 
fact that the EU Charter, although not binding, is principally intended to 
reaffirm the rights resulting in particular from those traditions, I would 
nevertheless point out that the constitutional instruments of  numerous 
Member States explicitly protect the right to establish trade unions and the 
defence of  their interests by collective action, the right to strike being, in 
that connection, the method most regularly referred to.63
With regard to the ECHR, the freedom to form trade unions and the right to 
resort to collective action are provided for in Article 11, relating to the freedom of  
assembly and of  association, of  which trade union freedom is merely one special 
aspect. It does not expressly refer to the right to collective action. Nevertheless, it 
covers such right through ECtHR case-law. In fact, the Court has held that “strike 
action is an important method by which trade unions protect their members’ interests. 
It follows that any restriction on the freedom to strike can be justified under Article 
11, 2 ECHR only if  ‘prescribed by law’, in pursuance of  one or more legitimate aims, 
and ‘necessary in a democratic society’ for the achievement of  those aims.”64 
In his Concurring Opinion in Hrvatski Liječnički Sindikat v. Croatia,65 Judge 
Pinto de Albuquerque observed: “the right of  association of  workers includes the 
following essential elements: the right to form and join a trade union, the prohibition 
of  closed-shop agreements, the right to bargain collectively with the employer and 
the right for a trade union to seek to persuade the employer to hear what it has to say 
on behalf  of  its members. In a democratic society, the ultimate practical “means to 
persuade the employer to hear” the demands of  the workers is obviously strike action. 
If  collective action represents the core of  the workers’ freedom of  association, strike 
action is the core of  the core. Indeed, striking predated both unions and collective 
bargaining. Thus, the taking of  strike action should be accorded the status of  an 
essential element of  the Article 11 guarantee.”66
Within the Council of  Europe system, another instrument is of  great relevance 
in the field of  social protection. The European Social Charter, enacted in 1961 
and revised in 1996, in Article 6, 4, explicitly protects “the right of  workers and 
employers to collective action in case of  conflicts of  interest, including the right to 
strike.”67 The ESC, however, did not include any effective mechanism to enforce this 
62 AG Mengozzi, Opinion, Judgment Laval, para. 68. 
63 Ibid., para. 77 and footnote 31–33. 
64 ECtHR (Third Section), 21 April 2009, Application No. 68959/01, Enerji Yap-Yol Sen v. Turkey, 
para. 25 ff., http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-92266. See also ECtHR (Fifth Section), 2 October 
2014, Application No. 48408/12, Veniamin Tymoshenko and others v. Ukraine, http://hudoc.echr.coe.
int/eng?i=001-146671.
65 ECtHR (First Section), 27 November 2014, Application No. 36701/09, Hrvatski Liječnički Sindikat v. 
Croatia, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-148181.
66 Concurring Opinion of  Judge Pinto de Albuquerque, Hrvatski Liječnički Sindikat v. Croatia, para. 8, 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-148181.
67 For a comment, see Stein Evju, “The Right to Collective Action under the European Social 
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right. Compliance by the signatory States is ensured through periodic reviews, and 
it was not until 1995 that an optional Protocol was adopted to allow a complaint 
before the European Committee of  Social Rights (ECSR). The Committee may 
also assess the compliance of  a national situation with the Charter, including when 
the transposition of  a European Union Directive into domestic law may affect the 
proper implementation of  the Charter.68 This is justified on the basis that when the 
EU Member States agree on binding measures in the form of  directives which relate 
to matters within the scope of  the European Social Charter, they should take full 
account of  the commitments they made upon their ratification of  the European 
Social Charter, just as they should all other international instruments to which they 
are parties.69 Ultimately, neither the ECHR nor the ESC offer an effective means to 
protect the right to strike at the European level.70 
In this scenario, the recent judgement delivered by the ECJ in the CASTA 
case, a reference for a preliminary ruling concerning the application of  EU general 
principles in national public activities whose relevant elements are confined to a 
single Member State, but from which it is nevertheless possible to determine a 
certain cross-border interest, necessitates reflection.71 The Court evaluated the 
compatibility of  Italian legislation authorising regional health authorities to entrust 
medical transport activities to registered voluntary associations fulfilling the legal 
requirements, directly and without advertising, by means of  reimbursement of  the 
expenditure incurred with EU principles on public health. It recognised that it is a 
purely internal situation (national transport contracts with voluntary associations) 
which pursues budgetary and public service purposes.72 The Member States are 
competent in the organisation of  their public health and social security systems, and 
such objectives are taken into consideration by EU law.73 The Member States must 
guarantee the exercise of  fundamental freedoms in the area of  health care and must 
not “introduce or maintain unjustified restrictions”, “however, in the assessment 
of  compliance with that prohibition, account must be taken of  the fact that the 
health and life of  humans rank foremost among the assets or interests protected by 
the Treaty and it is for the Member States, which have a discretion in the matter, to 
decide on the degree of  protection which they wish to afford to public health and on 
the way in which that degree of  protection is to be achieved (judgement in Azienda 
sanitaria locale No 5 ‘Spezzino’ and Others, C-113/13, EU:C:2014:2440, para. 56 and the 
case-law cited).”74 In the case at issue, the Court allowed restrictions on the economic 
freedoms in the pursuit of  EU general principles such as public health, limited only 
by the prohibition of  the abuse of  rights.75 
Charter”, in European Labour Law Journal, 2, No. 3, 2011, 196 ff.
68 See ECSR, Decision on the merits of  23 June 2010, Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT) v. France, 
Complaint No. 55/2009, paras. 32 - 33.
69 Ibid. 
70 Fabbrini, “Europe in Need”, 1197-1198. However, on Complaint No 85/2012 and its symbolic 
value, see Sciarra, “Pluralismo sindacale”, 240 ff. 
71 ECJ (Fifth Chamber), Case C-50/14, 28 January 2016, Consorzio Artigiano Servizio Taxi e Autonoleggio 
(CASTA) and Others v. Azienda sanitaria locale di Ciriè, Chivasso e Ivrea (ASL TO4) and Regione Piemonte, 
para. 42, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=173914&pageIndex=
0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=39385.  
72 Judgment CASTA, para. 57. 
73 Ibid., paras. 58 – 59. 
74 Ibid., para. 60. 
75 Ibid., para. 65. For some considerations, see Davide Diverio, “Il ruolo degli Stati nella definizione 
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What if  such a solution is (hypothetically) valid in the context of  the protection 
of  social rights (such as in the cases before the Italian and Portuguese Courts)? 
The balance between economic freedoms and social rights should be determined 
based on some considerations, namely the EU principles in the social context, the 
lawfulness of  the restrictions on economic freedoms, the compatibility of  national 
legislation with EU law, and the national law’s objective. In particular, it could be 
asserted that the protection of  social rights may be negatively affected in the case of  
national legislation that pursues “the objectives of  the good of  the community and 
budgetary efficiency on which that system is based.”76 
4. Collective action in EU private international law
The recognition of  the right to collective action in the general category of  
fundamental social rights does not imply, with certainty, the existence of  specific 
provisions in the EU legal order, but it necessarily indicates that the EU ascribes 
it some importance.77 At present, collective action, in cross-border contexts, faces 
legal obstacles affecting its effectiveness.78 The issue deals with the existing EU 
private international law, which does not provide for precise dispositions in favour 
of  disputes regarding employees engaged in transnational employment. 
As a general principle, employees are deemed in need of  protection as weaker 
contractual parties.79 Recital 18 of  the Brussels I Recast80 states: “[I]n relation to… 
employment contracts, the weaker party should be protected by rules… more 
favourable to his interests than the general rules.” Similarly, Recital 23 of  the Rome 
I Regulation81 provides that “as regards contracts concluded with parties regarded 
as being weaker, those parties should be protected by conflict-of-law rules that 
are more favourable to their interests than the general rules.” Moreover, Recital 
5 of  the Posted Workers Directive82 reads as follows: “[A]ny such promotion of  
the transnational provision of  services requires a climate of  fair competition and 
measures guaranteeing respect for the rights of  workers.” Recital 22 then states that 
“this Directive is without prejudice to the law of  the Member States concerning 
collective action to defend the interests of  trades and professions.” Unions may 
organise forms of  collective actions other than strikes, but it has been pointed out 
that the host Member States’ unions typically fail to arrive at a sustainable way to 
del modello sociale europeo”, in Studi sull’integrazione europea, No. 3, 2015, 515 ff. 
76 Judgment CASTA, para. 63. 
77 Thomas Welin, “The Freedom to Provide Services and the Right to Establishment -V- The Right 
to Strike. An Analysis of  the Laval and Viking Cases”, master’s thesis, University of  Lund, 2009, 19, 
http://lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/record/1562914.
78 In general, see Arnaud Nuyts and Nikitas E. Hatzimihail, Cross-Border Class Actions. The European 
Way, Munich: Sellier European Law Publishers, 2014.
79 For a deep analysis of  EU private international law on employment, see Uglješa Grušić, The European 
Private International Law of  Employment, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, spec. 7 ff. 
80 Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  12 December 
2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of  judgements in civil and commercial 
matters (recast), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A32012R1215. 
81 Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  17 June 2008 
on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/
EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A32008R0593. 
82 Directive 96/71/EC of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  16 December 1996 
concerning the posting of  workers in the framework of  the provision of  services, http://eur-lex.
europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:31996L0071. 
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organise and represent posted workers.83 
In this legal framework, the European Commission has suggested two proposals. 
The first initiative is the 2012 Proposal for a Council Regulation “on the exercise 
of  the right to take collective action within the context of  the freedom of  establishment 
and the freedom to provide services.”84 This followed the 2010 Monti Report on “a 
new strategy for the single market,”85 which addressed the question “on a practical 
ground, [of] whether the Posting of  Workers Directive still provides an adequate basis 
to manage the increasing flow of  cross-border temporary secondment of  workers, 
while protecting workers’ rights. On a normative ground, the question concerns the 
place of  workers’ right to take industrial action within the single market and its status 
vis-à-vis economic freedoms.”86 The 2012 Proposal is thus referred to as the (proposed) 
Monti II Regulation. In the 2010 Report, after recalling the Laval quartet sentences, 
the author suggested the introduction of  a provision to guarantee the right to strike, 
affirming that “a “social progress clause” would “immunise” the right of  strike, as 
recognised at [the] national level, from the impact of  single market rules.” 
The goal of  the proposed Monti II Regulation was to “lay down the general 
principles and rules applicable at [the] Union level with respect to the exercise of  
the fundamental right to take collective action within the context of  the freedom of  
establishment and the freedom to provide services.” In the Explanatory Memorandum 
accompanying its proposal, the Commission stated that the proposed Regulation 
sought to address the “tensions between the freedoms to provide services and of  
establishment, and the exercise of  fundamental rights such as the right of  collective 
bargaining and the right to industrial action” recognised by the ECJ decisions in Viking 
and Laval. It deemed the clarification of  the status of  the right to collective action 
in cross-border contexts to be necessary. A regulatory intervention at the EU level 
may be “the most effective and efficient solution to address the specific objective [of] 
reducing tensions between national industrial relation systems and the freedom to 
provide services.”87 
The Proposal, in its Recitals, recalled the international instruments that provide 
for the right to take collective action, which is the corollary of  the right to collective 
bargaining, without explicitly referring to the right or freedom to strike. Article 1 
contained the so-called ‘Monti clause’, which confirmed that the draft Regulation 
would not have affected the right to strike provided by the industrial relations laws of  
the Member States or their enforcement of  collective agreements. It was in line with 
the text of  a similar provision in the Proposal for a Regulation on jurisdiction and the 
recognition and enforcement of  judgements in civil and commercial matters (Brussels 
I Recast),88 but it was later rejected.89 Article 2 recognised that situations may arise 
83 See Grušić, The European Private International Law, 284. 
84 COM(2012)130 final, Brussels, 21 March 2012, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT
/?qid=1454353269393&uri=CELEX%3A52012PC0130. 
85 Mario Monti, “Report on a New Strategy for the Single Market”, May 9, 2010, http://ec.europa.
eu/internal_market/strategy/docs/monti_report_final_10_05_2010_en.pdf.
86 Ibid., 69. 
87 See COM(2012)130 final, para. 3.2 on the legal basis of  the proposed Regulation. 
88 See Article 85 of  the Proposal for a Regulation of  the European Parliament and of  the Council 
on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of  judgements in civil and commercial matters, 
COM(2010)748 final, Brussels, 14 December 2010, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TX
T/?uri=CELEX:52010PC0748&qid=1454361458167. 
89 See Jan-Jaap Kuipers, “Schemes of  Arrangement and Voluntary Collective Redress: A Gap in the 
Brussels I Regulation”, in Journal of  Private International Law, 8, No. 2, August 2012, 225 ff. 
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involving cases of  conflict in which their exercise may have to be reconciled in 
accordance with the principle of  proportionality in line with the standard practice by 
the courts and EU case-law. At least, the Proposal seemed to represent a framework 
for the regulation of  the right to strike at the EU level. The Commission withdrew 
the proposed Regulation after several Member States voiced objections concerning 
its legal basis,90 and it has not made alternative proposals since then.
The Posting of  Workers Enforcement Directive was the second act proposed 
by the Commission, and it was adopted in 2014.91 This Directive aims to reconcile 
the exercise of  the freedom to provide cross-border services under Article 56 TFEU 
with appropriate protection of  the rights of  workers who are temporarily posted 
abroad for that purpose. It took into account the issue of  how to set the right 
balance between the trade unions’ exercise of  their right to take collective action, 
including the right to strike, and the economic freedoms enshrined in the TFEU, in 
particular, the freedom of  establishment and the freedom to provide services.92 Its 
Article 1.2 contains a subsequent version of  the ‘Monti clause’, which states: “[T]his 
Directive shall not affect in any way the exercise of  fundamental rights as recognised 
in [the] Member States and at [the] Union level, including the right or freedom to 
strike or to take other action covered by the specific industrial relations systems in 
[the] Member States, in accordance with national law and/or practice. Nor does it 
affect the right to negotiate, conclude and enforce collective agreements and to take 
collective action in accordance with national law and/or practice.” Certain features 
should be highlighted: the disappearance of  the reference to Community/EU law; 
the mention of  the right or freedom to strike; the primacy granted to national law 
and practices; and the recognition of  the protection of  the right to strike as part of  
EU law.93
In the EU private international law framework on employment matters, the 
Rome II Regulation94 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations and 
the Brussels I Recast Regulation are of  interest. In particular, industrial action is 
considered in Article 9 of  Rome II. This conflict of  laws rule determines that the 
applicable law is that of  the country where the industrial action is to be taken or has 
been taken, but it only applies to non-contractual liability. This means that it does not 
cover the consequences for individual employment contracts, which are governed by 
90 On the dismissal, see Federico Fabbrini and Katarzyna Granat, “Yellow Card, but No Foul: The 
Role of  the National Parliaments under the Subsidiarity Protocol and the Commission Proposal for 
an EU Regulation on the Right to Strike”, in Common Market Law Review, No. 50, 2013, 115–144. 
91 Directive 2014/67/EU of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  15 May 2014 on the 
enforcement of  Directive 96/71/EC concerning the posting of  workers in the framework of  the 
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Article 8. Moreover, Article 9 does not include the place where the illegal industrial 
action causes harm.95 
According to Article 7 of  the Brussels I Recast, an employee or trade union 
may be sued in the Member State where the ‘harmful event’ occurred or may occur. 
The ECJ has interpreted this as including both the location of  the event causing the 
damage (e.g. industrial action) and the place where the damage occurred (e.g. where 
the firm allegedly suffered a loss). At present, the competent court is that of  the 
place where the business which engaged the employee is or was situated; instead, 
the jurisdiction should belong, in the case of  an action by an employee against an 
employer, to the court of  the place of  business from which the employee receives 
daily instructions;96 as regards industrial action, the forum for disputes, in line with 
the Rome II Regulation, should be the place where the industrial action is to be or 
has been taken.97 
It is clear that there is a discrepancy between the provisions at stake, which 
may lead to a situation in which a court has to apply the law of  another Member 
State, with the risk of  not fully guaranteeing the most favourable solution.98 This 
issue was brought to attention in the 2013 Report of  the European Parliament “on 
improving private international law: jurisdiction rules applicable to employment,”99 
after which a Resolution was adopted.100 It suggested amending Brussels I to clarify 
that, in disputes arising from industrial action, the courts of  the Member State where 
the industrial action is to be or has been taken should have jurisdiction. Furthermore, 
it proposed replacing the ‘engaging place of  business’ clause with a reference to the 
‘place from where the employee receives day-to-day instructions’. It underlined the 
importance of  ensuring coherence: “[T]he rules on jurisdiction for labour relations 
disputes need to be aligned with the relevant rules on applicable law.” Following this, 
the European Commission in its response simply noted that specific legislation on 
industrial action was unnecessary.101
95 See, in general, Filip Dorssemont and Aukje van Hoek, “Collective action in Labour Conflicts 
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2015, 41 ff.
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Law Taboo” in Private International Law”, in Journal of  Private International Law, 9, No. 3, December 
2013, 413 ff.
98 On the problem of  coordination between EU private international law provisions, see Aukje 
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2013, A7-0291/2013 (2013/2023(INI)), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.
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5. Concluding remarks
The Institutions have engaged in many reflections about the legal context 
of  collective action in the EU. The common starting point is the recognition of  
the fundamental social rights, whose protection constitutes an objective that EU 
law must pursue. The recent 2015 Study of  the European Parliament102 stressed 
the complexity of  the interrelation between EU Internal Market law and social and 
labour rights. It also acknowledged that “effective collective industrial action is a 
precondition of  a functioning system of  collective bargaining. However, generally 
wage levels and levels of  employment protection are more favourable for workers 
where trade union representation is effective, which again depends on the scope for 
collective industrial action.”103
In the past, other soft law instruments have been adopted in the field of  
collective action. The European Parliament, in its 2012 Resolution on collective 
redress, pointed out that “in the European area of  justice, citizens and companies 
must not only enjoy rights but must also be able to enforce those rights effectively 
and efficiently.”104 Effectiveness was also emphasised by the 2013 Communication of  
the Commission, which, specifically referring to the general principles of  European 
private international law, underlined that it should work efficiently in practice to 
ensure the proper coordination of  national collective redress procedures in cross-
border cases.105 From a more procedural point of  view, the Commission called upon 
the Member States to follow its 2013 Recommendation, whose “aim is to facilitate 
access to justice in relation to violations of  rights under Union law and to that end 
to recommend that all Member States should have collective redress systems at [the] 
national level that follow the same basic principles throughout the Union, taking into 
account the legal traditions of  the Member States and safeguarding against abuse.”106 
The need for the regulation, coordination and effective protection of  social 
rights seems to be key concept for the elaboration of  a European collective action 
framework. A legislative response to the critical balance between market integration 
and national social rights that was struck by the ECJ in Viking and Laval is requested. 
Revisiting the ‘Monti clause’ and the Monti II Regulation probably would be useful. 
A new act should define the means of  lawful cross-border industrial action and the 
procedure to be followed by unions before going on strike.107 It should also clearly 
provide that cross-border collective action in employment contexts is protected by EU 
law. Indeed, various European Union provisions expressly refer to the international 
legal instruments on social rights. Ultimately, the European Union will thus have not 
only an economic, but also a social purpose.108
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